However, in many ways these themes that are supposed to provide the context for interpretation are forced. Specifically, Graham himself admits that to us there appear to be two sections whose theme is logic (that is, in Graham's wording, "the realm of names"). But this, instead of causing him to question his theme-arrangement, prompts him to speculate that the Mohist "must be looking at logical problems from a different viewpoint which it would help us to locate."5 Rather than search for a peculiarly Chinese approach to logic, we might instead reexamine Graham's division of the text and the parallel themes that lead him to such speculation.
In an attempt to distinguish between the two sections that both resemble "logic," Graham admits that the first section he identifies, which he calls "description" (names and objects6), "shares most of its terminology with the 4 Ibid., 229. 5 Ibid., 231.
6 This section, "names and objects," is to be distinguished from a later pian of the Canons that Graham calls "Names and objects." In a later publication Graham no longer uses "description" for the relation of names and objects, but "discourse" instead; see his Disputers of the Tao. fourth discipline, disputation proper ['logic' or 'names only']."7 In spite of this common terminology, Graham insists that there must be a difference between the two sections-that is, that the Mohists believe there is a difference between the "realm of names and objects" and the "realm of names." (Significantly, this difference involves the temporal nature of the two realms, as we shall see below.) Yet, Graham admits that this difference "emerges distinctly only in the two sequences of propositions" (i.e., in two of the sections on the side of what Graham calls the "propositions" half of the Canons). He notes that "the difference ... is clear enough in the propositions but remains nearly invisible in the definitions."8 However, he also maintains that in the propositions, where the distinction is supposed to "emerge distinctly," "the Mohist seems especially concerned with the fundamental terms which the first discipline shares with the rest, first of all the word ku ti 'reason'."9 In other words, in the definitions half, Graham is unable to point to any difference between description and disputation. Moreover, in the propositions half, instead of the difference emerging distinctly," the shared terms emerge. Yet Graham does not permit this to invalidate his division of the two halves-the definitions and the propositions. Nor does it make him doubt what he claims to be the "parallelism of general themes" that seems to be his main justification for splitting the Canons just at that particular point, and referring to the two divisions as definitions and propositions. Instead, he relies solely on the following characterization of the first and fourth sections of the propositions for evidence that one of them is about names and objects (description) and the other is only about names (logic): he calls the first section "a closeknit sequence laying down procedures for deciding what is so of objects" and the last section "a series of miscellaneous propositions shown by logical ['names only' or 'disputation'] analysis to be admissible, self-refuting, consistent, unnecessary, inadmissible unless a condition is fulfilled" (emphasis added). Because what is at issue is precisely whether or not the first section is about "deciding what is so of objects" (as opposed to names only), this characterization of Graham's actually amounts to a claim that the first section is "a close-knit sequence" and the fourth is "a series of miscellaneous propositions." There is no doubt that the fourth section is a miscellaneous series. In contrast to it, the first section may seem "close-knit." But that is unrelated to the question of whether the first section is about "description" (names and objects) or the fourth is about "logic" (names). The fourth section, which Graham says is about names, contains items B 52 (which appears to be about supporting weights from hairs) and B 62 (which has something to do with the relation of a spherical object and being upright). Graham notes that these "are the only problems of B 34-82 which connect with the mechanics sections (B 25-29)." But B 52 and B 62 are not the only Canons whose subject matter seems incongruous with a section that is supposed to be concerned with disputation (names). B 60, for instance, seems to use a metaphor of hoeing to make a point about progress. B 69 appears to be about leading and following, using the metaphor of singing and borrowing someone's coat. B 65 seems to be about the tallying of wood and stone squares. B 56 also seems to be out of place in a section on "disputation proper." It appears to concern the submerging of a bramble in water. The only evidence offered that this is a separate section is that the last two of these Canons in the definition section discuss the words, "staying" and "necessary." Graham thinks these two terms constitute a bridge between the "transcience" belonging to the sections on names and objects and on ethics and the "eternity" belonging to the section on names and that on objects.
Of the two bridging sequences on knowledge and change, the sequence of definitions ends with zhi IL 'staying' (A 50), the temporary validity of names fitting transient phenomena in the first two arts, and bi , 'necessary' (A 51), the unending certainty of judgments in the last two.13
Graham's characterization of these sections as either "transient" or "eternal" creates more problems than it solves. In his ordering of the Canons, each of the four sections represents a different discipline of study (the names section is logic; the objects section, science; the names and objects section, description; and another section that involves both names and objects is referred to as ethics). Graham's characterization of these sections as eternal or transient leads him to argue that the study of names is closer to the study of objects because these operate according to necessity, whereas the study of names To some extent, Graham seems to attribute the connections between the discipline of names and the discipline of objects to a social situation in which the same people work in both areas.
The sections on optics and mechanics surely reflect social conditions comparatively rare in history until the 16th century in Western Europe, where the Scientific Revolution soon followed, the explosive situation when men with speculative minds are in close contact with men who work with their hands.15
Graham also attributes this similar use of terminology to interrelations in the subject-matter. However, what he cites as the connection in the subject-matter seems to amount only to a connection between the eternal relations within the names section and the eternal relations within the objects section. The similarities in these relations do not extend to the discipline of "the relation of names to objects" (description). In this view, when separated from one another, the relations of names and objects are "eternal," and necessary knowledge is possible both within the realm of names (logic) and within the realm of objects (science).
Graham suggests that when relating names to objects (in description), our capacity for certainty of knowledge is reduced to the (minimal) requirement of consistent procedures. "As long as we are describing the realm of 14 On the other hand, Graham asserts that the study of names is no closer to the study of names and objects than to any other of the disciplines. In any case, Graham argues that, in keeping with "eternal" nature, the requirements for the relations in the discipline of names are stricter than in the "transient" discipline of names and objects (description). He states that the difference between the realm of names and the realm of names and objects is that "when we confine ourselves to the realm of names, these consistencies Of course, the context of these occurrences is as important as their frequency. In one of the most prominent occurrences of shifei in the description section (A 88), Graham takes the Canon to be a discussion of the difference between the "absolute" and the "relative"; hence, perhaps, a discussion of the difference between logic and description. As things that are "absolute," A 88 lists heibai (,'l) "black and white," guijian ($,) "dear and cheap," as well as shifei (il) "being this or not being it" [Graham's translation], and cunwang (ft) "present or absent."21 Graham manages to interpret these pairs of opposites as contrasting with a set of "relative" terms that includesjianrou (Qi) "hard and soft" sisheng (ITEL) "dead and alive," qujiu (-,A) "departing and approaching," and youwu (14Mi) "having and lacking."22 Presumably, there is some difference between "dear and cheap" and "hard and soft" that makes the former pair "absolute" while the latter is "relative, instance, to explain why "having and lacking" is "relative," he appeals to the "explanation"--?*, X*N, f Md-2.23 (Graham takes fu g to be the same asfu i that appears elsewhere in Mozi meaning "wealthy." Zhi `? is written with a heart signific, and emended from nu ~; Graham associates it with the "native intelligence" referred to in Mencius 7 A115.) Now, in spite of the fact that he has just classified being dear or cheap as "absolute," Graham concludes from this line that "having (there being) a rich family or an excellent native intelligence is no less relative than being rich." He fares little better in explaining "dead and alive" as a relative pair of items: X reads: "If 'beautiful' is said of this, then inherently it is this that is beautiful; if it is said of another, it is not the case that this is beautiful ...."25 Thus, even Graham cannot force the Canons to conform to a hypothetically rigorous distinction between shi and ci, a distinction that appears to have no basis outside of the Canons. Graham admits that Names and objects, a later text-which he claims is so analytically careful as to have distinguished the form of the sentence for the first time-does not follow the Canons in this strict treatment of shi and ci. He contends that it is because Names and objects uses the term mou X = "X" (although it does so only in one line) that shi and ci are no longer carefully distinguished. This leaves him free to alter the translation of shi in any occurrence in Names and objects to suit his own interpretation.
The distinction Graham proposes between shi as "this thing in question" and ci as "the instance here" seems to imply that logic can only include objects in the form of "the thing in question." Indeed, Graham's description of logic as "names only" suggests as much. His contrast between the Mohist's dispute over "converses" and the Western view of logical "contradictories" also makes this point, although indirectly. Graham says the difference is that in a "converse" (fan) one side may say something like "it is a dog" and the other must say "it is not a dog." Thus, "The point aboutfan is that if one kind of thing is an ox we can 'reverse' and say that all others are nonoxen, as contradictories only one is true, asfan both are true."26 But there seems to be more to Graham's characterization of Mohist disputation than just that it is true on both sides. There is also some suggestion that Mohist logical converses differ from Western contradictories in that converses do not involve particular objects. However, in spite of this apparent contrast between "claims" and "things" (or "questions" and "a certain man"), the point ultimately does not seem to be that the difference between the Mohist's converses and the Westerner's contradictories is that the Mohist's converses are not "about the same things."29 In fact, according to Graham's translation of dang 2 as "fit the fact," when the Canon says one side wins in disputation, it fits one particular fact-that is, in Graham's other terms, the "name" fits the "object." Thus, when Graham says "one man says it is this and the other that it is not," this "it" is a "same thing"-a fact/object to be fit-and in this sense the "names only" section also seems to be about relating names to objects. Indeed, Graham insists that the "it" about which claims of disputation contend is not the object as described (language) but the actual object ("in front of the eyes"), A crucial question is whether the thing proved in disputation to be necessarily an ox is conceived to be the thing as described or the actual object in front of our eyes. There can be little doubt that the latter is the right answer.30 Thus, having distinguished the necessary disciplines of "names" and "objects" from the merely consistent discipline of "relating names and objects," Graham begins to rejoin them-pointing to ways in which the "names" section is about relating to objects after all. means the realm of names and objects, the relation of names and objects is knowable because in some ways (as in the above quote) these necessities overlap. This overlap between the disciplines seems to account for Graham's contention that all Mohist knowledge is "necessary":
The Mohist raises no epistemological questions, he has no doubts that whether by observation, report or explanation we can know, and that when we do 'we necessarily do know' (A 3). Presumably the relation between the animal I see and my knowledge of it is necessary in the sense that if it is not really there I do not know, merely suppose (yi wei J21, cf. A 24).32
The kinds of knowledge Graham mentions here in the context of not raising epistemological questions (observation, explanation, and report) include both the necessary and the merely consistent disciplines.33 Knowing by observation that a particular animal is an ox seems to belong either to description or to science. Knowing by explanation that it fits the standard for ox belongs to logic. Graham does not expound on how one can know that it is an ox by report, but a report does not suggest either science or logic. If knowledge is necessary even within the merely consistent discipline of names and objects, postulating a distinction between the disciplines seems unwarranted.
Another way that Graham tries to fill the gap he posits between the certainty of "names" and the temporary validity of "relating names and objects" is through the notion that an object can engender a name, which, when compared to a standard, takes on the necessity of complementary relations (like that of shifei). Graham finds evidence for this in two "obscure and corrupt passages." Moreover, by changing his terminology from "objects" to "facts," Graham adds certainty to the consistent procedures of description. Although he insists that the discipline still only aspires to consistency, in the Names and objects section the relation between names and objects becomes a relation between propositions and "facts."36 The argument that seeks to establish a connection between "root" and "fact" is quite complex. Canon A 86 lists four types of sameness. Graham identifies these "samenesses" with what is mentioned in 34 Later Mohist Logic, 38.
35 In Graham's text and the original di has no "mouth" radical. Graham takes the reference to "complement" in A 39 to mean the name "pillar" that is applied to the perceived object. Yet, it is not clear that even his greatly emended version of A 39 is concerned with "the object as we perceive it." Significantly, Graham does not attempt to explain what the example of serving a ruler has to do with objects of perception.
Moreover, A 85 may not be about "complement" either. The term "complement" is a part of a double emendation that is somehow related to "keep as it is," but even after the emendation the meaning of the phrase remains cryptic. Both zhong and di (the only reference to "complement" in this Canon) are emended from 'early' and 6 'lookout, tower'.
In A 51 as well, di is an emendation-again for tai. Graham reads #A as shu A 'ripe, cooked', although he notes most editors have followed Bi Yuan in emending to zhi U 'hold'. In the last line, Graham emends from bi , to zhi _t because he finds bi "unintelligible in this context. 
